GAULLE Charles de. 3 L. A. S., [Modlin] 7, 18 and 25 June 1919, to his parents Henri and Jeanne de GAULLE in Paris; 4, 4 and 8 pages in-8, envelopes enclosed. On the state of Poland, and the signing and conditions of the Peace. 7th June, to his father. He begins by talking about the promotion without competition at the École de Guerre, in which he does not seriously believe he will be accepted. His students had still not arrived. In fact, he tried to join "the 3rd Polish Corps Staff, 2nd office (operations)". He considered that "the Haller army (three quarters of whose staff was French) was a really serious force, and very capable, if need be, of driving back the Bolsheviks or helping to calm the Boche. For the moment, some of the Haller divisions, which had appeared in Galicia, were advancing effortlessly against the Ukrainians, whom Pilsudski's Polish army had been unable to overcome. He ended with this bitter observation: "While fifteen hundred French officers were fighting, or preparing to fight, in the ranks of the Polish troops, Americans, Englishmen and Italians were pouring into Warsaw, showing their insolence and uselessness. They were part of vague missions whose most apparent, but unacknowledged, task was to do business of all kinds. All these people are, of course, made of gold, as opposed to the French, whose unbelievably high cost of living here quickly reduces their double pay. Like most of my compatriots, I finished the war overflowing with feelings of general xenophobia, and imbued with the conviction that if we are to gain respect, we must return to the sensible use of our military force, now the greatest in the world"... 18 June, to his mother. He begins by talking about the general strike in France, thinking "that at the heart of this movement were many vile intentions and very probably the devious machinations of the German pseudo-socialists, who were currently in power with the enemy", but that Clemenceau's government and the Marshals retained their prestige and influence, thus warding off the risk of a serious revolutionary movement. But "it is of the utmost urgency to sign the peace treaty or to resume the war if the enemy refuses to bend to our will. I have to admit that the German newspapers I read say that the Entente's conditions are unacceptable and will not be accepted. But I know this song from having heard it at the time of the armistice and in the same tone. Yet they signed the armistice, and my guess is that they will also sign the peace treaty with tears and protests"... 25 June to his mother. "So the peace has been signed. All that remains is to get the enemy to carry it out, because as we know him, he will do nothing, give up nothing, pay nothing, unless we force him to do something, to give in, to pay, and not just by force, but by the ultimate brutality. This is the only way to deal with him. His commitments are smoke, his signature a bad joke. Fortunately we hold, and must absolutely hold, the left bank of the Rhine. There will certainly be plenty of reasons to stay there, because I do not believe for a second that Germany will make any serious compensation payments. Not because they can't pay, but because they don't want to. So we will immediately come up against this whole science of whining quibbling, prolonged delays and devious stubbornness, which is the clearest aptitude of this race. [...] As the years go by, the recovering Germany will become more arrogant, and in the end will not pay us nearly what it owes us. Moreover, it is to be feared that our allies will soon become our rivals and lose interest in our fate. The left bank of the Rhine will therefore have to remain ours"... He would be surprised if his proposal for the Legion of Honour came to fruition: "I have just been asked by HQ (1st Bureau, Decorations) if my wounds were equivalent to the loss of the use of a limb. Naturally, I said no...". In Poland, it was dead calm: "the fighting against the Ukrainians or the Bolsheviks is just a pleasant joke. Each party advances in turn without loss or damage. It was exceptional for anyone to be killed or wounded. The Haller army, now fairly numerous, commanded and led by Frenchmen and well supplied with equipment, was the only serious military element existing between Prussia and Siberia. It therefore appeared to the ministers and generals here as an obstacle to dancing in circles, and they feared it above all a resounding victory that could have the counter effect of a coup d'état. So they had only one idea: to disperse them to the four corners of the country to prevent them from taking any serious action, and indeed they did. The French mission made great efforts to take charge of the overall military direction: operations and organisation, but it was unable to do so until further notice. In order for the Poles to be flexible towards us, they would have to do what had just happened to the Czechs with the Hungarians. The advance of the Magyar troops threw them into the arms of General Pellé"... LNC, I, p. 460 to 463.