GAULLE Charles de. L. A. S., 31 December 1915, to his father Henri de Gaulle in Paris; 8 pages in-8 (trace of military censorship reagent, wetness with small hole and slight marginal loss). Long letter taking stock of the war while awaiting victory. He sends his "dearest Papa" his wishes for "1916, along with all my deep and respectful affection, the only wish you should receive: that of French Victory... 1915 will have been a year of severe and useful lessons for our armies. We have learned the value of resources, we have forced ourselves to have them, we have learned how to use them, we have finally disciplined the whole, coordinated the scattered efforts of our specialists and accustomed our command and staffs to a certain extent to understand the new form of war and to use resources not randomly but in a reasoned way. Moreover, the moral strength of the troops was in no way affected, despite the immense losses suffered. The will to win, the feeling of our worth, the spirit of sacrifice have only increased in our ranks. The three major efforts made by our armies to drive the enemy from our soil and pursue them on theirs: in Champagne, January-February-March; in Artois, May and June; in Artois and Champagne, September-October, did not produce the decisive results we had hoped for. But they have shown that our strength is making immense and constant progress. They proved to ourselves, they proved to our enemies, they proved to the world that our determination to win does not waver, that our resources are constantly increasing, and that at the same time our knowledge of how to use them is growing... The outcome of the battle is less doubtful than ever. No doubt the enemy will be able to prolong it thanks to its energy and discipline, thanks above all to the extreme and irremediable inferiority of our republican-parliamentary regime. But his defeat is certain. One day or other we will crush it, and we will go to its territory to force it to repair the damage it has done to the Patria for centuries. And then, it seems that Providence is on our side: it avoids making us pay dearly for our heaviest faults. Thus, for example, the Serbian expedition, which was a strategic monstrosity and should normally have ended in disaster at Strumnitza, simply ended in disaster, and isn't that the least we can pay for such stupidity in war with such an adversary?... I am convinced that wisdom will prevail in the end in this affair as in others, and that on the next day of the offensive on our front, which is the only important one, we will have the simple good sense to bring back from Salonika the good soldiers and the excellent shells that we had the stupidity to pile up there to the great joy of our enemies. The purpose of war is not to dig trenches at every point on the globe where it pleases Germany to make us run. The aim is to destroy the enemy by concentrating all our resources - and we don't have too many! - on the decisive theatre of operations. If we fail to break through in France and Belgium, if we fail to cross the Meuse and cross the Rhine, we will fail to win the war. And since, thank God, we are not giving up at all, the logical and strategic truth is not to distract from this essential goal the infantryman or the shell that we may lack to achieve it on the day we resolve it"... LNC, I, p. 236. Attached is a photocopy of a letter to a friend, 29 November 1915.