GAULLE Charles de L.A.S, Metz, 15 October 1937, to Paul Reynaud; 6 pages in-4 on the printed letterhead of the 507th tank regiment. Very interesting document giving a detailed description of the types of tanks used by the French army. "It has been six weeks since I had the honour of being at the head of my Regiment, and, in spite of the occupations and obligations that this entails for me, I retain as vivid as ever the respectful admiration that I hold for you, and the resolution to serve you on any occasion that you offer me. My regiment is equipped with two types of modern tanks: R 35 (Renault 1935), which is a light tank weighing a dozen tonnes, heavily armoured (40 mm of cast steel) for its low tonnage, armed with a 37 mm gun and a machine gun, and capable of being controlled by radio. Its shortcoming (perfection is not in this world) is that it only has a reduced crossing capacity, which means it loses some of its speed in difficult terrain. D 2 (also manufactured by Renault), a 'medium' tank weighing 20 tonnes, with 40 mm of armour (laminated steel, i.e. very strong), armed with a 47 mm cannon and two machine guns, with good crossing capability and, consequently, good speed in all terrain, mounted by three men and controlled by radiotelegraphy. Having to use this equipment and the personnel who serve it directly myself, and being in a garrison where there are continual opportunities for manoeuvres and where the quality of the command as well as the number of troops encourages experimentation, I am able to study from below the very problems that you, Minister, have often considered from above. From this very different point of view, I have come to exactly the same conclusions as we did. We said, at the highest level: French policy needs a military instrument capable of striking, and of striking immediately if necessary. To ensure that this instrument has the necessary power, speed and permanence, we need to have recourse to mechanics and maistrance; in other words, we need to create a battleship corps, based on tanks, mechanised infantry and artillery, and served, for the most part, by specialists. Looking at things from below, I can see the following today: The modern tank is an enormous fact. You have to see it evolve, fire and crush people on foot, on horseback or in cars to understand that its appearance is a revolution in the form and art of war. All tactics, all strategy, all weaponry now revolve around it. Already, in the troops, it is no longer conceivable to attack without tanks, or to defend without first opposing the tanks. Unless we accept a decisive material and moral inferiority vis-à-vis the potential enemy, we must therefore have tanks. (In fact, we are building them.) But these new tanks must be organised so that they can be used in concentrations, as common sense, experience and even the regulations recommend. So let's make large armoured units, to which we'll give, along with the tanks, infantry, artillery and signals, equipped to follow them and fight with them. Finally, since all this equipment is very expensive and its performance varies enormously depending on the quality of the crews, let's give it a very solid and very broad armoury of professional specialists to serve it, as the Navy and Air Force do, for the same reasons. I can assure you, Minister, that these ideas have made immense progress in the ranks of the Army. All it would take now is for a Minister worthy of the name to express his will so that the ultimate resistance of hurt feelings, alarmed circumspection, jealousies between individuals and also between different arms, ceases to hold back the necessary reform. On that day, everyone would be convinced, in good faith, that there was nothing else to be done. Paperclip marks and light stitching. Bibliography: L. N. C., vol. 1, p. 837-838.