GAULLE Charles de L.A.S., Paris, 23 September 1936, to Paul Reynaud; 6 1/2 pages in-8 on the printed letterhead of the Presidency of the Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale. Military questions and modernisation of the army. "All the signs are that your time is approaching... As far as the military issue is concerned, you will have seen that the measures envisaged by the Government (fourteen billion in appropriations to be requested over four years in order to modernise our forces) are exactly along the lines we are advocating. In particular, the construction of tanks, the mechanisation of units and an increase in the number of soldiers serving on contract. However, both in conception and execution, we are still unable to take advantage of these developments to build something great and transform the conditions of French security. In short, the programme - still very unclear in the minds of those who drew it up and, a fortiori, in that of the Minister of War - seems to be as follows: Instead of one "mechanical light division" (a good instrument for exploration but very inadequate for breaking and exploitation, i.e. for the offensive), have three. - Create two tank divisions, but without organically giving them the specialised infantry and artillery that would enable them to act on their own. The intention, therefore, is to distribute them, if necessary, among the existing divisions. Finally, to provide the three light mechanical divisions and the two tank divisions with sufficient specialist personnel, but in too small a proportion for them to be able to enter the line at any moment with all their resources. It is therefore another poorly-tailored proposal, a tribute more or less involuntarily paid to our conceptions, but which does not have the necessary scope to change the game as it should. Yesterday I was summoned by M. Chautemps (rather secretly, because I think he doesn't like M. Daladier very much). He asked me to explain to him the military problem and the solution we are pursuing. He seemed very favourable, struck as he was by the alarm of our European associates since the observation on 7 March last that we were militarily powerless to intervene. He even insisted a lot (which I would have been careful not to do myself) on the importance that the specialised Corps would take, in the midst of present and future disturbances, with regard to public order (interior and North Africa)". Traces of paperclip, small tears without affecting the text. Bibliography: L. N. C., vol. 1, p. 802-803.