GAULLE Charles de. Autograph manuscript, Doctrine a priori ou doctrine des circonstances ?, 1924; 34 fol. pages in titled folder. Important military study, which will be reprinted in Le Fil de l'épée. This study, written at the end of 1924, was published in the Revue militaire française on 1 March 1925 (pp. 306-328). It was revised in 1932, with a number of deletions, to form the chapter "De la Doctrine" in Le Fil de l'épée. The study is divided into six parts. The manuscript, in black ink, contains a few erasures and corrections. There are significant variants with the text of Le Fil de l'épée. "The principles governing the use of means: economy of forces; the need to proceed by concentration and, consequently, by phases or leaps; surprise for the enemy; security for oneself, are only of value - how many have already professed this - if they are adapted to the circumstances. There is nothing specifically military about this observation, and it applies to all types of action, whether warlike, political or industrial. Assessing the circumstances in each particular case is therefore the essential role of the leader. If he knows them, measures them, exploits them, he wins; if he ignores them, misjudges them, neglects them, he is defeated. Action must be built on contingencies. A general who has an excellent army and has marshalled it meticulously in battle is defeated because he has no information about the enemy. A politician with the will, the time, the resources of a large country and a solid system of alliances, fails because he does not understand the character of the times. An industrialist with powerful tools ruins himself by ignoring the state of the market. It seems that the French military mind is reluctant to recognise the essentially empirical nature of warfare. It constantly strives to construct a doctrine that allows it, a priori, to at least orientate the action and to conceive its form, without taking into account the circumstances that should be its basis. He is constantly trying to deduce the concept from constants known in advance, whereas in each particular case it must be inferred from contingent and variable facts"... Part II looks at tactics in the eighteenth century, and the wars of the Revolution and the Empire, where leaders were able to adapt to and exploit circumstances. The disaster of 1870 can be explained by "the arbitrariness of theory" (III). A new doctrine was developed, focusing on the offensive (IV): "Colonel Pétain claimed that the conception of a manoeuvre should be based on the circumstances and that the concentration of resources, particularly firepower, should be the basis for execution. We preferred to direct action a priori towards the immediate and unreasoned offensive by system; we wanted to turn combat into a disorderly rush forward. V "We know the tactical consequences of these metaphysical principles during the border battles" at the start of the 1914 war. "The victory at the Marne brought magnificent glory to the leader who was able to free himself from abstract theories and draw his conception from the circumstances of which his mind embraced the whole"... De Gaulle details the different phases of the war, the successes coming from "the inspiration of a great leader, freed from a priori doctrines"... VI "De Gaulle concludes: "Ulysses, returning to his homeland of Ithaca after a long war, had himself tied to the mast of the ship to avoid giving in to the seductions of the Sirens and rolling into the abyss of the seas. Thus, after a thousand dangers, the prudent Achaean was able to recover his kingdom and enjoy a glorious rest. Now that the time has come for French military thought to reconstitute the philosophy of its doctrines, may it not succumb to the age-old lure of a priori, absolutes and dogmatism! May it not succumb to the age-old lure of the a priori, the absolute and dogmatism! May it stick to the classical order, following illustrious and recent examples! It will draw from it that taste for the concrete, that gift for measure, that sense of reality that illuminates audacity, inspires manoeuvre and fertilises action". Enclosed are: - the typescript ([1]-27 p. in-4) with a few corrections and additions by hand: the epigraph borrowed from Marshal Bugeaud, and the signature at the end: "Capitaine de Gaulle 14 Square Desaix Paris (15e)", with date stamp dated 7 Nov. 1924; - a note by Henri de Gaulle, making a few comments on the text (1 p. in-fol.); - a typewritten study Observations sur une étude intitulée : " Doctrine a priori ou doctrine des circonstances " (4 p. in-4), 13 November 1924, annotated by de Gaulle in pencil : " Colonel laure à laquelle le Maréchal avait demandé de rédiger son avis sur l'étude ".