GAULLE Charles de. Autograph manuscript, [Les États du Levant, ca. 1932]; 15 fol. pages with numerous erasures and corrections. Unpublished geopolitical study on the future of the States of the Levant. It was probably written at the same time as the article in Combats du temps de paix (1932), and is in some ways its continuation and conclusion. It has remained unpublished. The article, extensively crossed out and corrected, was given to type, as indicated by the pencilled headings: "Neither title nor headings - 4 copies". "The plan to replace the Mandate with another regime established by treaty between France and the States of the Levant, the aim of which would be to grant independence to the latter, involves considerations of a military nature. These considerations are vital, because the States of the Levant created by war have so far only been able to last by the dynamic and static force of arms. The Command's opinion is therefore essential with regard to the clauses of future treaties concerning internal and external security. In order to make an informed judgement on the matter, we must first examine the general conditions in which the States of the Levant find themselves internally and externally, then the military resources they are capable of acquiring and maintaining, and finally the nature and degree of the obligations we will in fact retain towards them, whatever the wording of the diplomatic documents to be drawn up. The conclusion will be self-evident. This is followed by five numbered parts, the beginning of which we quote below: I "In the internal order, we are dealing with countries whose moral unity has not been achieved, where the national sense exists only in the form of an intermittent xenophobia, where the races are multiple and hostile to one another, the religions bitterly opposed, the interests contradictory, where one discerns powerful separatist currents and no centralising instinct; A country with no dynasty, no elite, no traditions of its own, no common ideals; a country which, for as long as history has been written, has never known independence or even seemed to want it, changing masters over the centuries with no reaction other than local intrigue or revolt"... II "This weakness serves as an age-old bait for the neighbours, and external covetousness towards the countries of the Levant remains active"... III "These States, so weak from every point of view and so threatened from outside, what forces will they be able to raise and maintain to ensure internal order and, if necessary, their independence? IV "All in all, assuming that the states of the Levant are left to their own devices for some time to come, and given the brutal opposition of families and interests at home, the chronic appetites that threaten them from outside, and the mediocrity of the military means at their disposal, there is reason to believe that the era of order within and perfect security of the borders will not coincide with the era of our retreat"... V "Thus the general situation resulting from future treaties is unlikely to reduce the degree of our military obligations in the Levant. It is even possible that they will add to it. If, therefore, we wish to ensure good conditions for meeting these obligations, it must be made clear that only the military status quo corresponds to necessity and that it should be maintained"... And de Gaulle concluded forcefully: "In the present state of affairs, and considering only the military order, it would be a serious risk to bind ourselves by restrictive clauses. Once you've experienced Marasch and Aïn-Tab, you don't leave Aleppo without guarantees. Before evacuating Damascus, we must be sure that we will never have to fight the battle of Khan Meisseloun again, and if we have to withdraw from the Djebel-Druze, we must first mark out suitable sites at Kafer, Mezraa and Souieda for future memorials to the dead". Attached is the diploma for the Commemorative Medal for Operations in Syria and Cilicia awarded to Battalion Chief de Gaulle, Beirut, April 1931.