NAPOLEON BONAPARTE. L.S. of Napoleon to Cambaceres with 9 autograph words bringing a correction on the dictation, dated of Finckenstein, May 27, 1807. 1 page recto and a half page verso. his letter begins with "My dear cousin" and is probably addressed to the general Jean-Toussaint Arrighi de Casanova (1778-1853) who takes part then in the campaign of Prussia and Poland. Cambaceres, archchancellor, is recipient for copy of the letter. Napoleon starts by giving against-order to the eight thousand men of the Irish legion directed on Brest and which must reach Antwerp as well to cover the Escaut as to defend Holland. He writes in his own handwriting: "in the event of a descent by the English" where the letter continues as follows under dictation: "that General Marescot goes to Antwerp with an inspector of the artillery and some officers of the two arms to ensure that the places of Berg-op-Zoom and Bréda are put in a state of defence. If it should ever happen that the enemy should make a great expedition into Holland, you would send half of the camp of Boulogne and half of the camp of Saint-Lô under the orders of General Saint-Cyr to reinforce the army of Holland. General Saint-Cyr, who is a prudent man, would manoeuvre with this second corps in such a way as not to expose Boulogne. It is necessary to recommend to general Férino to exert well and discipline the troops in order to draw from it all the possible benefit...". In head of the letter, Cambaceres added: "copied in whole but not by the parts". Watermarked wove paper, 3 small holes of size of pin, paper a little scorched. Provenance: n° 72 of the sale of the autographs of the 1st Empire in Drouot on November 20th, 1968 under the expertise of Claude Coulet and André Faure. The catalogue is enclosed. This document sheds light on the western defensive concerns of the French Empire while its main forces were engaged in the East. In the spring of 1807, Napoleon was at the castle of Finkenstein (West Prussia), from where he was directing the campaign against the Russian and Prussian forces. On 22 May 1807, a few days before this letter was written, the governor of Danzig had asked to "enter into talks" just as the French troops were preparing to attack. This imminent surrender represented a major strategic victory for Napoleon, who wrote to Cambacérès that this capture would be "very important" because it would provide him with "great resources" and make "a large number of troops available". Although he was concentrating on his eastern campaign, Napoleon remained perfectly aware of the vulnerabilities of his empire on its western flank. The United Kingdom, an implacable enemy of Napoleonic France, had a powerful navy capable of projecting invasion forces onto the coasts of the French Empire or its allies. The letter of 27 May reveals that the Emperor was anticipating a possible British offensive against Holland or the Scheldt, strategic areas whose loss could have seriously compromised the French position. The first notable element was the reorientation of the troops: Napoleon gave a counter-order to the eight thousand men of the Irish legion initially directed towards Brest, redirecting them towards Antwerp. This decision revealed a prioritisation of threats and a rapid reallocation of military resources. The protection of the Scheldt and Holland appeared to be an immediate concern, more urgent than projects involving Brest. The letter goes on to detail a multi-pronged defence plan to deal with a possible "descent of the English": - The deployment of General Armand Samuel de Marescot (1758-1832) to Antwerp with artillery experts to fortify Berg-op-Zoom and Bréda. His appointment to oversee the defence of the Dutch strongholds was not fortuitous. Marescot had already demonstrated his skills in this field, notably in Lille, which he had helped to put "in a state of defence" and where he had supervised major defensive works, including "the line of the Deûle, the canal from Lille to Douai, and the entrenched camp of La Madeleine". His expertise in fortification made him the ideal man to prepare Berg-op-Zoom and Bréda to resist a British attack. - A conditional reinforcement strategy: in the event of a major British expedition to Holland, mobilisation of half the camps at Boulogne and Saint-Lô under the command of General Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr (1764-1830). In the letter, Napoleon described him as a "prudent man", which explains why he entrusted him with the delicate mission of reinforcing the army in Holland while protecting Boulogne, a strategic site for plans to invade England. - Instructions to General Pierre Marie Barthélemy Férino (1747-1816) on troop training and discipline. His military experience dated back to the Seven Years' War, and he had entered the service in 1768. This long experience probably explains the trust Napoleon placed in him to prepare the troops. The main interest of this letter lies in its demonstration of Napoleon's ability to manage several theatres of operation simultaneously. Even as he was fully engaged in a major campaign in the East, he was keeping a close eye on his western borders and anticipating potential threats from the British. The Emperor did not simply react to events, he anticipated them and prepared graduated and adapted responses: if the enemy made "a great expedition", then certain forces would be mobilised. This proactive approach characterises his command style. The document also shows how Napoleon selected and used his generals according to their specific skills: Marescot for his knowledge of military engineering, Saint-Cyr for his tactical prudence, and Férino for his ability to train effective troops. This letter also highlights an aspect of Napoleon's strategy that is sometimes overlooked: its defensive dimension. Although known for his daring offensives, Napoleon attached great importance to protecting his territory and that of his allies, as shown by his attention to the defence of Holland and the Scheldt. The precise instructions given to Generals Marescot, Saint-Cyr and Férino bear witness to an in-depth knowledge of the capabilities of his officers and a judicious allocation of military resources in the face of potential threats. This ability to orchestrate operations on several fronts simultaneously, combining offensive action in the East and defensive preparation in the West, illustrates the strategic mastery that made Napoleon one of the greatest military commanders in history.